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TH-E-~A.TIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP IN
AN ERA OF SCARCE RESOURCES: IS THERE
A DUTY TO TREAT?
Maxwell J. Mehlman*

F

OR the past twenty years, the dominant theme in American health
care has been the need to control escalating costs. This concern has
led to the development of new methods for delivering and financing
care, such as employer-driven managed health care plans 1 and the diagnosis-based payment system for Medicare. 2 These approaches have
sought to reduce costs by encouraging health care providers to alter
their behavior, including decreasing hospital admissions, the length of
stay in hospitals; 3 and the performance of diagnostic and therapeutic
* Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. B.A., Reed College (1970); B.A., Oxford University (1972); J.D., Yale Law
School (1975). The author would like to thank Susan Gornik and Karen Visocan for their researchassistance, the faculty at the University of Washington School of Law for comments on.an
earlier version of this paper delivered at a faculty workshop, and Jean Carter for her work in
preparing the manuscript.
I. A managed health care plan is a health. insurance program in which an administrative
entity attempts to control patient access to health care providers and provider services in order to
contain costs. For a lengthier description, see Stanley J. Reiser, Consumer Competence and the
Reform of American Health Care, 267 JAMA 1511 (1992).
2. The diagnosis-based payment system for Medicare is a patient classification scheme which
pays the hospital on the basis of the patient's diagnosis rather than on the basis of the services
actually provided to the patient. The system is derived by classifying all possible diagnoses identified in the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification ("ICD9-CM") system into 23 major diagnostic categories ("MDCs") based on organ systems, and further organizing the diagnoses into 467 diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"). Patients within the
same DRG can be expected to evoke a set of clinical responses which, on a statistical average, will
result in approximately equal use of hospital resources. Unlike the fee-for-serVice payment system
that it replaced, the DRG system creates no incentive for the hospital to provide additional services to patients in order to increase revenue. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988) (describing the DRG system for hospital payment under Medicare).
3. Since the inception of the diagnosis-based payment system, "the average length of stay is
down 10% for patients 65 and over and 6.1% overall. Patient days are down 16% for those 65
and older and I 7% overall. . . . [In addition,] more than 3/.1 of United States hospital beds were
filled in 1980, [while] less than ¥.l were occupied [by 1988]." Clay Mickel, Excess Capacity Becomes Center of Policy Debate, HosPITALS, Sept. 5, 1989, at 38, 39.
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procedures:; Much of the pressure has been exerted on institutional
providers, such as hospitals and health maintenance organizations
("HMOs").~> Directly or indirectly, however, physicians increasingly
feel the pressure as well.
Despite the increasing power of institutional providers and payers
of health care, physicians continue to play the dominant role in determining the care that patients receive. Patients cannot be admitted or
discharged from the hospital except on a physician's orders. Diagnostic
and therapeutic procedures are performed either by physicians or pursuant to their instructions. 6 For the most part, only physicians can prescribe prescription drugs. 7 If costs are to be controlled, it is generally
recognized that physicians must be induced to change their practice
4. John Wennberg has demonstrated variations in local practice patterns. Through a technique
known as "small area analysis," he and .his associates have documented wide variations among
different New England communities in the rates of performance of certain surgical procedures.
For instance, the highest rate of tonsillectomies in those areas studied was six times the lowest
rate, while the rate of hysterectomies displayed a four-fold variation between the highest and
lowest areas. See John E: Wennberg et al., Will Payment Based on Diagnostic-Related Groups
Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEW ENG. J. IviED. 295 (1984); John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn,
Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas, Sci. AM., Apr. 1982, at !20; John Wennberg &
Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1002 (1973).
M:ark Hall notes that "if the existing !ega! standard is as broad as Wennberg's evidence suggests,
it can amply accommodate massive cutbacks in care within the tremendous variations in practice
patterns that the established custom encompasses." Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard
Under Health Care Cost Containme/11, 17 LAW IviED. & HEALTH CARE 347, 348 {1989).
5: Hospitals and HMOs have felt the pressure to limit'procedmes due to the Medicare DRG
system. Because they are paid according to the diagnosis rather than the services rendered, they
are compelled to reduce services in order to reduce costs. See st~pra note 2. HMOs typically
emphasize their relatively low costs. However, that advantage would likely be lost if they did not
limit procedures and lengths of stay. See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary
Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. Rtv. 439, 454 (1991).
6. However, some states permit non-physicians to engage in certain forms of medical practice.
For example, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Texas have laws which allow the practice of midwifery. See Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (Mass. 1985) (mere
practice of midwifery did not constitute the unauthorized practice of medicine; no statutory prohibition against the practice of midwifery by lay persons); Leggit v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612
S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (midwifery excluded from the practice of medicine by state
statutes and regulations); Banti v. Texas, 289 S.\V.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956) (practice of
midwifery by lay person is not unauthorized practice of medicine).
7. $orne states permit non-physicians such as physicians' assistants to prescribe some prescription drugs. See, e.g., Cook v. Workers' Compensation Dept., 758 P.2d 854, 859 (Or. 1988) (en
bane) ("Nurse practitioners also are eligible to apply for prescription privileges upon completion
of an approved course of pharmacology."); United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 656 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing a Georgia physicians' assistant to prescribe and
order routine medication). But see United States v. Jones, 816 F.2d 1483 (lOth Cir. 1987) (stating that, notwithstanding valid medical reasons, an individual must be a physician registered with
the DEA in order to prescribe medication).
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patterns.
This recognition has led to cost control efforts aimed specifically at
physicians. Third-party payers, such as government entitlement programs, insurers, and employers, are beginning to second-guess physicians' decisions by requiring prior approval before services are provided
to patients or before the physicians' claims for reimbursement are paid.
Physicians· also are being given financial incentives to limit care. For
example, a physician may have a portion of his fees withheld, to be
returned to him at the end of a budget period only if he has successfully held down costs. 8 Sometimes the pressures are less direct. For example, hospital administrators are reported to threaten physicians with
sanctions, such as limiting or revoking their admitting privileges, if
they exceed the lengths of stay prescribed by third-party payers. 9
While these cost containment efforts may be design_ed to achieve a
societal goal of reducing health care costs, they impact directly on patients by creating the risk that physicians will withhold beneficial medical services. For example, several cases have addressed allegations that,
as a result of efforts by providers or third-party payers to contain costs,
patients have lost limbs or have committed suicide because their physicians prematurely discharged them from the hospitaJ.l° Cost containment may be desirable and even necessary, but is it appropriate to
8. See Alan A. Hillman et aL, How Do Financial Incentives Affect PhysiCians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of HMO"s, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 87 (1989):
In a typical HMO, the insurer divides the premiums received from enrollees into several
special-purpose "referral" funds to pay for the services of primary care physicians, those
of specialists and hospitals, and outpatient laboratory testing. In addition, a percentage of
the payment for primary care physicians is often withheld until the end of the year, when
the status of the referral funds is determined. The amount withheld is returned to the
physicians if there is a surplus in the referral funds, but not if there is a deficit. Primary
care physicians who overspend the referral funds may incur additional penalties, and surpluses in the funds may be used to create bonuses for parsimonious physicians.
!d.
9. "Staff model" HMOs, in which physicians are salaried employees of the HMO, may refuse
to renew the contracts of physicians who overuse services. See Paul Craig, Health Maintenance
Organization Gatekeeping Policies: Potential Liability for Deterring Access to Emergency Medical Services, 23 J. HEALTH AND HosP. L. 135, 136 (1990); see also Hillman et aL, supra note 8,
at 87 (providing additional examples of sanctions for a lack of cost control). Hospital administrators often issue quiet warnings or even threaten to revoke staff privileges of physicians whose
patients cost the hospital too much money. See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and
Economic Advocacy, New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275, 284
(1991). Because the doctor who is not cost conscious will pay a price professionally or financially,
the physician is placed in a type of conflict of interest.
10. See Wickline v. California, 239 CaL Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986) (leg amputated as a result
of premature discharge from hospital); Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. CaL, 271 CaL Rptr. 876 (Ct.
App. 1990) (patient committed suicide after early discharge from hospital).
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achieve it chiefly at the expense of patients? 11 This question bears directly on the behavior of physicians in relation to patients and raises
the most difficult issue that physicians confront: As cost containment
efforts increasingly limit health care resources, to what extent are physicians required to furnish access to health care regardless of resource
constraints? 12
The answer might be sought within the principles of professional
ethics, butno ethical consensus on this issue has emerged. Some commentators assert that the physician must maximize his patient's welfare
without concern for costs. For example, the Principles of Ethics of the
American Medical Association state that, notwithstanding the societal
interest in containing health care costs, "concern for the care the patient receives will be the physician's first consideration." 13 Other experts argue that, in addition to his role as care-giver, the physician is a
gate-keeper who must subordinate the interests of an individual patient
if necessary to attain societal· <;:ost containment objectives. 14
In their relationship with patients, physicians are bound not only
by the ethics of their profession, but by rules of common law. 15 The
physician owes the patient a legal duty to provide reasonable care. He
risks liability for malpractice and other sanctions if he fails to provide
the care to a patient that would be provided by a reasonable physician
under the same circumstances, even if he is prevented from doing so by
limited resources. 16 The law also imposes a fiduciary duty on the physiII. Wickline and Wilson demonstrate that the detriment to the patient is not offset by a direct
reduction in her health insurance costs. The patient bears the full burden of the harm herself,
while the cost savings are spread across all insureds in the form of reduced premiums.
12. The answer to the question may depend on the nature of the resource constraint and on
the manner in which it affects the patient. Resource constraints can take different forms: the
patient can lack sufficient funds to pay for services; a third-party payer may provide only partial
coverage for a service or may refuse to provide coverage altogether; a provider may be pressured
to economize on the care provided to patients through mechanisms such as payment on a capitated basis; or a geographic area may lack a type of facility or piece of equipment, such as a
pediatric intensive care unit or a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") device.
13. AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.09 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Jacqueline J. Glover & Gail J. Povar, The Ethics of Cost-Conscious Physician
Reimbursement, in PAYING THE DOCTOR: HEALTH POLICY AND PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT 19,
22-23 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 1991).
15. In some respects the rules of common law which govern the patient-physician relationship
have been changed or supplemented by legislative enactment. However, most jurisdictions continue to rely on the rules of common law. For a discussion of statutory changes, see infra notes
123-26 and accompanying text.
16. See infra part II. For a discussion of civil sanctions which a state may impose upon a
delinquent physician, see Richard P. Kusserow et al., An .Overview of State Medical Discipline,
257 JAMA 820 (1987).
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cian to act in his patient's best interests. 17 The physician might be liable for punitive damages if be violates this duty in order to promote the
interest of others in reducing health care costs. 18
From a legal standpoint, then, the question becomes: To what extent do the rules of common law governing the patient-physician relationship require that the physician provide access to health care regardless of resource constraints? If the physician withholds care and is sued
by the patient for malpractice, can the physician assert that he acted
reasonably in light of limited resources? Can the physician argue, for
example, that he is not required to furnish the care because the pati<::nt's third-party payer refuses to pay and the patient herself cannot
pay? Can a rural or inner-city physician defend himself by arguing
that he is not required to furnish a certain type of care, such as stateof-the-art magnetic resonance diagnostic imaging, if the equipment
necessary to render the care is not available in the area because it is
too expensive? Can he assert as a defense that the scarce resources
saved by denying care to one patient can be better spent on other patients, or that, by denying care to some patients, health care costs for
other patients can be reduced? Finally, can the physician avoid liability
by arguing that the patient agreed to receive care that fell below the
standard of "reasonableness" because the physician agreed to charge
her a lower price and she could not otherwise afford care?
This Article examines the three major areas of common law that
govern the patient-physician relationship: contract law, tort law, and
fiduciary law. It explores the definition of the patient-physician relationship within each doctrine and the extent to which physicians must
furnish care to patients regardless of resource constraints. After con~
eluding that the common law cannot ensure that individual patients
receive access to needed health care services, the Article explores how
the law might be changed to achieve this result.
I.

THE ROLE OF CONTRACT

In order to determine whether a physician has a duty to render
health care regardless of resource constraints, we will first look to the
law of contract. If the patient-physician relationship were governed by
a purely contractual approach, the answer would be rather simple. In a
purely contractual relationship, the parties themselves establish the
17.
18.

See infra part III.
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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terms of their relationship. Thus, they can agree to any arrangement
that suits them regarding the performance to be expected from each
other' including allowing services to be withheld under certain circumstances or to be rendered in a manner that would be substandard in the
absence of a contractual agreement.
Application of a purely-contractual approach to the patient-physician relationship would require the physician to furnish the patient
with only those services that he had agreed to provide. If third-party
payers were unwilling to pay for necessary services, the physician could
insist that the patient pay for the services out of her own pocket and
could refuse to provide the services or terminate the relationship if she
declined. H the patient wanted to ensure that she received services beyond those covered by her insurer, she could bargain with the physician
and agree to pay the additional price, find another physician who. was
willing to provide the services at a lower price, or find another insurer
who offered broader coverage. The patient could not sue the physician
for failing to provide a service unless the physician had agreed to provide the service as part of the contract.
Similarly, the parties would be free to establish the performance
standards within the relationship. The physician would only be held to
a standard of "reasonable care" if the parties agreed upon that standard. The patient might prefer to bargain for a higher standard, such
as "optimal care." If the patient did not wish to pay for a reasonable
standard of care, she could agree to accept a lesser standard at a lower
price. 19 In theory, the parties could even decide that the physician did
not owe the patient a fiduciary duty 20 or could define that duty in
whatever fashion they pleased.
A purely contractual approach to the patient-physician relationship is suggested by two divergent theories. One is neoclassic economic
theory, which proposes that rational, self-interested individuals will
bargain with each other to maximize their individual welfare until they
19. A statement of this proposal is found in Richard A. Epstein, J11edical I11alpractice: The
Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 87. See also Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform
of Tort-Law Dogma: Markel Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 143, 149 (suggesting that strong reasons exist to allow a provider to vary the
extent of legal obligations incurred so that a more economical product can be provided for those
consumers who wish to secure it); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and che Comractual Foundation for Medical Services, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1986, at 201 [hereinafter Epstein, lmperfecl Information] (suggesting that allowing private parties to contract for medical care will result in better care and more beneficial malpractice
resolutions).
20. For discussion of a physician's fiduciary duty to his patient, see infra part IlL
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attain an equilibrium state, known as Pareto optimality, in which additional trades will not result in further mutual benefit. This state is
deemed to be an optimal state for the parties which will produce an
efficient allocation of resources within society. In terms of health care,
patients would be expected to bargain for access to services and for
standards of physician behavior that best suited their individual needs.
The theory also holds that individual welfare-maximizing transactions,
taken together, will result in an optimal societal allocation of health
care resources relative to other desired goods and services. 21
A contractual approach to the patient-physician relationship is
also suggested by a development specifically related to health care: the
movement to increase patient autonomy. This movement originated in
the late 1960s as a response to physician paternalism and professional
domination of the patient-physician relationship. 22 The movement substituted for paternalism a model of shared decision making in which
the physician is primarily a communicator and facilitator who assists
the patient. The legal tool of the move toward patient autonomy is the
principle of patient consent to treatment, which has been elevated from
a technical requirement that the physician obtain the patient's consent
to a touching to avoid being liable for battery, 23 to a major obligation
of the physician to transmit suffic;ient information about alternatives,
risks, and benefits to the patient. This information enables the patient
to make her own treatment decisions in consultation with the
physician. 24
The theoretical basis of the doctrine of informed consent has much
21. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 44-45, 49-51
(1988).
22. For discussion of the information gap between patients and physicians, and the physicians'
dominance resulting therefrom, see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Gove;nment"s Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 849, 861 (1981 ); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care:
An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 965, 967 (1981); Epstein, Imperfect Information,
supra note 19, at 202; William H. Ginsberg et al., Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice
Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 264; Clark C. Havighurst, Competition
in Health Services: Overview, Issues, and Answers, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1122-23 (1981).
23. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hasp., 88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958) (where no emergency
exists, a physician who can ascertain alternative situations prior to an operation should inform the
patient of such alternatives); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (doctor found liable
for battery for failure to secure patient's consent to an operation).
24. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Sard v. Hardy, 367 A.2d 525 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); see also Marjorie M. Schultz, From
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (explaining importance of patient autonomy).
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in common with the neoclassic economic approach described earlier.
Both theories assume that only the patient can know her own preferences and aversion to risk; therefore, allowing her to make decisions for
herself is the most efficient means to enable her to maximize her own
welfare. Once the patient is allowed to make her own treatment decisions, it follows that she should be allowed to make other decisions regarding her relationship with her physician, such as determining what
legal obligations to impose on him, and what costs or risks to bear her~
self. For example, after being informed by her physician about the risks
and benefits of treatment alternatives, the patient might be said to assume the risk of harm if she chooses a treatment that the physician
does not advocate, or one that his colleagues would reject as unreasonable.25 If the patient is adequately instructed regarding the trade-offs,
why should she not be allowed to bargain with the phy~ieian over the
dimensions of price, quantity, and quality? Should she not be permitted
to agree to the level of care which the physician will provide in exchange for his fee and allow him to reduce the amount of care to conserve her scarce resources? Why should she not be free to hold the
26
physician to a lesser standard of care in return for a lower price?
Despite the superficial appeal of a purely contractual approach
and the supportive thrust of the doctrine of informed consent, the
courts virtually without exception have rejected the proposition that patients and physicians should be allowed to bargain over the terms of
their relationship. For example, courts have struck down the following
types of patient-physician agreements: a patient's release of the physician from liability for negligence, 27 a limitation of the patient to
25. See Schneider v. Rivici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing validity of such an express
assumption of risk to be decided by jury in malpractice case rather than holding defense invalid as
a matter of law).
26. Allowing a physician to provide the type and amount of information for which the patient
bargained would constitute the ultimate marriage of contract theory and the informed consent
doctrine. A patient who desired a significant amount of information would pay more than those
patients who wanted less information. See Maxwell j_ Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 37488 (1990) (discussing why this approach is problematic due to the nature of the market for
information).
27. See Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. !98!); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Ctr., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. !969); see also Tunic!
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 44! (Cal. !963) (rejecting agreement between patient and
hospital releasing hospital from liability); Abramowitz v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 494
N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1985) (same regarding agreement with dental clinic); Leidy v. Deseret
Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (same regarding post-operative therapy center).

1993]

A DUTY TO TREAT

357

$15,000 in damages, 28 and an acceptance of binding arbitration by the
patient. 29 In fact, courts have even refused to uph<;>ld agreements by the
patient to pay a fee that the court deemed unreasonable. 30 The only
cases in which the courts have been willing to uphold agreements to
limit the physician's liability have involved experimental or unconventional treatments that the patient agreed to try after being fully informed of the risks and benefits, only to claim later that the physician
had acted unreasonably in failing to employ a more conventional approach. However, these cases can be distinguished on a public policy
basis. It may be argued that failing to hold the patient to her agreement would render the physician strictly liable for any harm to the
patient merely by virtue of employing an experimental modality, and,
as a result, legitimate experimentation would be unduly _discouraged. 31
In refusing to uphold bargains between patients and physicians, the
courts have not always provided a clear basis for their objections. 32 The
latent explanation for such objections is the inability of a purely contract-based relationship between patients and providers to achieve the
efficiency goals of contract theory itself.
Contract theory, like the neo~lassic economic theory upon which it
is based, assumes that the parties possess equal bargaining power and
28. See Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 {W.D.N.C. 1979).
29. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 {Ct. App. 1976) {admission form
which included arbitration agreement constituted contract of adhesion and was therefore unenforceable). But see Madden v. Kaiser, 552 P.2d 1178 {Cal. 1976) {patient held to binding arbitration which had been agreed to by bargaining agent acting on patient's behalf).
30. See Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423 {La. Ct. App. 1960) {ruling that physician's charge
of $1939 for services valued at approximately $525 by other doctors was excessive and should be
reduced to $650, despite patient's ability to pay entire charge); Chattanooga-Hamilton County
Hosp. Auth. v. Price, No. 614, 1988 WL 27230 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1988) {providing that
court can consider reasonableness of hospital charges).
31. See Schneider v. Rivici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987); Colton v. New York Hosp., 414
N.Y.S.2d 866 {Sup. Ct. 1979). Schneider's factual scenario is problematic in that the physician
defendant was not engaged in legitimate research; rather, he was employing a technique to treat
cancer that might be considered quackery. After a period of time, howeve~, he allegedly advised
his patient to discontinue the treatment because it had not proven effective. In any event, the court
did not hold that the patient's release of the physician from liability was valid, but only that the
validity of the agreement was an issue for the jury to decide. For a discussion of the legitimacy of
subordinatiJ]g a patient's protection to the interests of society, see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
32. The most extensive analysis is presented in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d
441 {Cal. 1963), which has been criticized as unpersuasive, incomplete, and inoperative. See
Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, 225 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 {Ct. App. 1986) {criticizing Tunk/
factors as not providing adequate guidance); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking. the Allocation of
Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1986, at 173, 184-85.
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equal, if not complete, information about the nature and consequences
of their transactions. 33 Yet in terms of the patient-physician relationship, tlfe physician possesses far greater bargaining power and far superior information. The physician's greater bargaining power stems from
the following factors: his status as a professional; the patient's need for
health care services and the lack of competition between health care
providers, which limits the patient's choices to obtain care elsewhere; 34
the physician's greater medical knowledge and expertise; 35 and the
"credence" nature of health care services, which makes it difficult for
the patient to determine the quality of the services and therefore to
.
determine what price to pay. 36
This imbalance undermines the assumption that a contractual arrangement between the patient and physician will produce an efficient
result. 37 In the first place, due to the lack of information aqout the
relationship between quality and price of medical care, it is improbable
that the parties will agree to a price that will yield the desired degree
of quality (for example, imagine trying to arrive at a price for an automobile without knowing what brand or model was being purchased).
Even if information about price andquality were available, the physician's training and expertise would make it more likely for him-as
opposed to the patient-to possess the information or to obtain it
33. See generally COOTER & ULilN, supra note 21, at 235.
34. See M. Traska, Home Health Care: Hospital's Activities Vary by Region Across the Nation, HOSPITALS, Feb. 5, 1986, at 54.
35. See Epstein, Imperfect Information, supra note 19, at 202; Robinson, supra note 32, at
188 (arguing that the information gap can be filled by requiring disclosure by the physician).
36. A "credence good" is one whose quality cannot be detected even after it is experienced. In
contrast, the quality of a "search good" can be determined by the purchaser. prior to purchase,
while the purchaser of an "experience good" can determine quality by experiencing the good after
it has been purchased. Health care is a "credence good" because patients typically cannot evaluate whether or not they have received high quality care from a clinical standpoint. A favorable
·result following an episode of care cannot necessarily be attributed to the care, since the patient's
condition might have improved of its own accord. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 941, 951-52 (1963); David Hemenway,
Thinking About Quality: The EConomic Perspective, 9 QuALITY REV. BuLL 321, 325 (1983).
37. Cooter and Freedman note that disloyalty could be controlled or prevented by contract if
the parties to a fiduciary agreement possessed perfect information. However, they proceed to state
that the parties in a fiduciary relationship are unable to foresee the conditions under which one act
produces better results than another. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1048
(1991). For more on the inefficiencies of such contracts, see Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Meiaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Mehlman, supra note 26, at 388-91 (arguing that fiduciary
contracting requires communication of information from the physician to the patient to ensure
efficiency).
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cheaply. Together with the patient's need for health care services--often a dire need-and the lack of meaningful alternatives, 38 the
physician's superior information may enable him to take advantage of
the patient by appropriating surplus gains from trade for himself. 39 The
patient's· only means to prevent such appropriation is to expend resources to monitor the physician's behavior. Due to her information
deficits, however, the patient cannot determine the proper amount to
expend on monitoring. 4 ° Furthermore, monitoring a professional is expensive, particularly when the servi<;:es delivered are of a credence type;
only another professional of equal or greater expertise is likely to be
able to detect a breach of the contract terms. 41 Finally, the more the
patient spends on monitoring the physician, the less she has left for
purchasing health care. 42
In rejecting a purely contractual approach, the common law recognizes the power imbalance between the parties by protecting the patient from the risks of arm's-length bargaining. In its place, the law
imposes a set of non-negotiable tort and fiduciary duties on the physi38. See Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, The Dissemination of Physician Fee Information: Impact on Consumer Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behaviors, I .J. HEALTH & Soc. PoL'Y
75, 82 (1989) (noting that.only a minority of patients engage in consumerist behavior).
39. See RiCHARD LIPSEY & PETER STEINER, ECONOMICS 459-61 (6th ed. 1981) (explaining
economics and profits relating to health care issues and physician's ability to take advantage of
patient due to superior knowledge).·
40. This is a variation on the principal-agent problem in economics. For illustration of the
scope of the model in economics, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985); Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51
EcoNOMETRICA 7 (1983); Oliver D. Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY, FiFTH WORLD CoNGRESS 71 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987);
BENGT HOLMSTROM & JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF THE FiRM (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 456, 1987); DeMott, supra note 37, at 879.
41. The patient could rely on external monitors such as professional disciplinary bodies or the
government. However, the patient-physician relationship would no longer be purely a matter of
private contract. Furthermore, it would become necessary to establish some preexisting standards
in order to govern the behavior of the external monitors. Such monitoring of the monitor would
create a sort of infinite regression.
42. One proposed solution is for the patient to rely on third-party payers to negotiate with
providers on the patient's behalf. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 1133 (by virtue of group
organization, most consumers are now able to obtain expert assistance in choosing insurance packages); Havighurst, supra note 19, at 147 ("Although consumer ignorance had long been deemed
to preclude a workably competitive market for health services,. consumers of health care are encountering no appreciable difficulties in the emerging competitive environment because they have
been able to rely upon sophisticated agents [such as employers and unions] to bargain with providers on their behalf."). Among other things, however, this solution assumes that third-party payers
will endeavor to maximize the patient's welfare rather than their own or the welfare of a pool of
patients. See Mehlman, supra note 26, at 375-77.
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cian as the more powerful party. 43 The duties that the courts impose
may not always achieve optimal results, but the law assumes that externally imposed terms governing the relationship are more likely to
lead to an efficient result than terms negotiated by the parties
themselves. 44
However, there remains one critical respect in which the rules of
contract control the terms of the patient-physician relationship under
common law. The formation of the patient-physician relationship continues to be based upon the contractual doctrine of mutual assent. 45
That is, the physician must agree to enter into a relationship with a
patient before he is required to treat the patient and to fulfill the other
duties externally imposed upon him. 46 He cannot be forced to assume
these obligations against his will. 47 Contract retains a central role, but
is one step removed from the interaction of the parties within their relationship: If the physician does not like the terms impose'd upon the
patient-physician relationship by the common law, he cannot vary
them; however, he can decline to enter into the relationship with the
patient in the first place. We will label this contract principle "Axiom
1" and return to it later.
In summary, an exploration of contract law provides only a partial
answer to the question of whether the physician is required to provide
access to services regardless of resource constraints. We have not identified those obligations imposed upon physicians within the relationship;
we only know that the physician is not free to escape or to lessen them
by negotiating with the patient. Axiom 1 tells us that the physician can
refuse to enter into the relationship with the patient in the first place.
This suggests that if the physician is required to treat patients regard43. See infra parts II and III.
44. One might also argue that the Jaw rejects a purely contractual approach because such an
approach would yield unfair results for patients. However, contract's failure to render an efficient
result makes this argument unnecessary.
45. For an older case exemplifying the common Jaw approach, see Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59
N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (finding no duty to aid person in peril).
46. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 442.
47. By statute, the common law has been changed to a limited degree. The federal government requires hospitals and physicians receiving Medicare reimbursement to treat emergency patients in certain situations. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), which took effect April 7, 1986, imposes three responsibilities on hospitals offering
emergency medical care: the hospitals must examine all patients· seeking emergency care; the
hospital must stabilize the patient if an emergency exists, or transport the patient to a facility that
can; and the hospital cannot transfer an unstable patient unless another facility can offer better
treatment. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988)).
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less of resource constraints once he enters into the relationship, he can
avoid the problem by not initiating the relationship. But we do not yet
know if, or to what extent, this treatment obligation will be imposed on
him, and therefore we cannot predict whether, or under what circumstances, he will take advantage of the escape route that Axiom 1
affords.

II.

THE ROLE OF TORT

A second set of rules that the law imposes on the patient-physician
relationship is the law of torts. Once the relationship is created by mutual assent, tort rules intervene to establish the standard of care owed
by the physician. 48 In tort terms, the problem of the physician's role in
the face of resource constraints translates into the following question:
Does tort law prescribe a "unitary" standard of care, under which the
physician must behave reasonably regardless of resource constraints, or
does the law allow resource constraints to be taken into consideration in
determining what is reasonable?
Many commentators urge that physicians must treat all patients
alike regardless of their ability to pay, their health insurance coverage,
or their area's availability of state-of-the-art health care facilities or
equipment. 49 Any other approach, they contend, would legitimize a
two-tiered system in which physicians would be free to deliver inferior
care to the poor. 50 According to this argument, resource considerations
should not vary the standard of care.
Other commentators, such as Mark Hall, assert that the current
48. Tort rules also govern the standard of care for the patient by establishing the standard for
contributory or comparative negligence.
49. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the
Screws, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 985, 1025 (1986); Leslie C. Giordani, Comment, A Cost Containment Malpractice Defense: Implications for the Standard of Care and for Indigent Patients,
26 Hous. L. REV. 1007, 1030-31 (1989); Note, Rethinking Medical Ma/p~;actice Law in Light of
Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1019 (I 985); see also Meiselman v. Crown
Heights Hosp., 34 N.E.2d 367, 369 (N.Y. 1941) (finding prima facie case on issues of malpractice
and willful abandonment where boy severely crippled due to doctors' failure io continue treatment
because of patient's inability to pay); Gray v. Davidson, 130 P.2d 341, 345 (Wash. 1942) (ceasing
treatment of unemployed plaintiff would create liability if causally linked to plaintiff's harm).
50. See Paul Starr, Medical Care and the Pursuit of Equality in America, in 2 SECURING
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 3 (President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethi~al Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Researched., 1983) (showing that hospitals provide less care or a
lower quality of care to indigent patients); see also Jack Hadley et al., Comparison of Uninsured
and Privately Insured Hospital Patients, Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome,
265 JAMA 374 (1991) (demonstrating that hospitals generally devote significantly fewer resources to uninsured patients).
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standard is flexible enough to take resource constraints into account. 51
Generally, the basic tort standard of what is "reasonable" is established by the medical profession. 5 2 If the profession feels that it is being
forced to render care without regard to resource constraints, it can simply reinterpret the standard_ to reflect those constraints. If physicians in
rural areas lack state-of-the-art imaging machines, for example, the
profession can adopt a standard of care under which use of the machines in rural areas is not required. 53
Haavi Morreim has argued that the current standard of reasonableness does not contain this degree of flexibility because courts possess
the ability to set the standard of care regardless of where it is set by
the custom of the profession. 54 She maintains, however, that vesting
judges with such authority is ill-advised. In her. opinion, the law should
be changed to reflect a bifurcated standard: Under this standard, physicians would be held to a standard of competence that ignores resource
constraints. However, they would not be obligated to provide access beyond what the patient had contractually bargained for with the pro51. See Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health_Care Cost Containment, 17
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989). Siliciano makes a similar argument by analogy to
products liability law. He contends, for example, that the driver who chooses to purchase a small
car with few safety features and who is subsequently injured in an automobile accident would not
be permitted to recover against the manufacturer on the basis that the car did not protect her as
well as a more expensive model. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 439.
52. While courts retain the power to reject the professional standard, see New England Coal
& Coke Co.. v. Northern Barge Corp. (In re Eastern Transp. Co.), 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932)
(owner of tugboat liable even though such tugs were universally not equipped with a radio to
receive storm warnings), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981
(Wash. 1974) (universal practice of ophthalmologists not to administer glaucoma tests to patients
under age 40 was negligent); Hall, supra note 51, at 349, they rarely do so.
53. Hall asserts that the argument that the standard of care can take resource limits into
consideration is also supported by the courts' rejection of the strict locality rule. The purpose of
moving to a national or "similar locality" standard, he argues, is to prevent the profession from
relying too heavily on resource limits at the local level to escape liability for substandard care. See
Hall, supra note 5 I, at 350. While this argument is clever, it ignores the fact that courts began to
move away from the strict locality rule long before the issue of cost containment-and the resulting recognition of resource constraints-arose. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 258 A.2d
595, 598 (Md. 1969) (employing similar locality test); Lane v. Calvert, I 38 A.2d 902, 905 (Md.
1958) (degree of skill required of physician is what is "ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally"). The more likely explanation for the rejection of the strict locality rule is that
the rule denies plaintiffs adequate access to expert witnesses.
54. See Morreim, supra note 9, at 317 ("[C]ourts are increasingly requiring ... a national,
basically uniform standard . . . ."); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of
Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1719, 1724 (1987) ("[A]s health resources become increasingly
stratified, should the standard of care become similarly stratified? Currently, the law answers this
question with an emphatic 'no.' "); see also cases cited supra note 52.

1993]

A DUTY TO TREAT

363

vider or with third-party payers. In any event, the outcome is the same
under the approach of either Morreim or Hall. The physician would be
entitled to assert resource constraints as a defense to a charge of substandard care so long as the physician met the standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances.
Are these critics correct in arguing that the theory of tort law is
compatible with a defense of limited resources to a charge of substandard care? The answer to this question lies in an understanding of what
tort law means by "reasonableness." In essence, this is a standard
designed to maximize social utility. 55 Risks and resulting injuries can
be imposed on victims without compensation so long as the person creating the risk acts in a manner that yields net societal gain. In short,
the objective of tort law is utilitarian: the good of the individual can be
sacrificed to increase the good of the whole. 56
Once the standard of reasonableness is understood as essentially
utilitarian, it is not surprising that we find commentators like Hall and
Morreim asserting that the standard of care should vary to reflect resource constraints. The only issue is whether a flexible standard-under
which some patients appropriately may be denied treatment because of
resource limits-is likely to achieve greater societal benefit than an inflexible standard. It is difficult to argue that denying treatments to a
patient would never maximize social utility. Hence, a unitary standard
may not be appropriate in all cases. For example, it is possible that,
55.

See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 557

(I 972). Fletcher notes that reasonableness provides a test for activities that should be encouraged

and that reasonable men presumably seek to maximize utility. Thus, to ask what a reasonable
man would do is to inquire into the justifiability of the risk. He proceeds to state that the paradigm of reasonableness
challenged the assumption that the issue of liability could be decided on the grounds of
fairness to both victim and defendant without considering the impact on society at
large . . . . [F]ault came to be an inquiry about the context and the reasonableness of the
defendant's risk-creating conduct. . . . It provided the medium for tying . . . liability to
maximization of social utility.
!d. at 557-58 .
. 56. Fletcher further notes that reasonableness is determined by a straightforward balancing of
costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net societal utility (benefit), it is reasonable and the victim is
not entitled to recover from the risk creator; however, if the risk yields a net societal disutility
(cost), it is not reasonable and the victim is entitled to recover. !d. at 542. Similarly, Henry Terry
suggests that the test for justifying risks is a utilitarian comparison of the benefits and costs of the
defendant's risk creating activity. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1915);
see also Beatty v. Central Iowa Ry., 12 N.W. 332 (Iowa 1882) (employing cost benefit analysis to
hold that railroad need not eliminate all risk when designing a grade crossing); Felske v. Detroit
United Ry., 130 N.W. 676 (Mich. 1911) (defendant owner of a streetcar company not liable for
injury caused by train jumping the tracks).

364

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:349

from a utilitarian standpoint, denying expensive lifesaving resources to
one elderly patient so that many mothers can receive adequate prenatal
care would produce a greater societal benefit."' H may be difficult to
determine if a particular level of access produces the maximum amount
of societal benefit. Juries and judges may disagree over whether a physician in a particular case acted reasonably or not. Nothing in the doctrine of tort law, however, requires the standard to be held rigid despite
resource limits.
Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind Axiom 1 from the
discussion of contract law. 58 The earlier discussion showed that the
physician cannot vary the legal rules governing his relationship with
the patient. Once he enters into the relationship, the rules of tort law
dictate that the physician must act reasonably-that is, he must maximize societal welfare. The combined effect of tort and contract rules
requires that, if the physician incorrectly estimates what constitutes
reasonable behavior, he bears the risk of legal liability for malpractice
and cannot shift that risk to the patient. However, Axiom 1 states that
the physician can always refuse to enter into the relationship in the first
place. Thus, as long as physicians retain such discretion, any rule that
requires physicians to provide services regardless of resource constraints would simply cause physicians to refuse to initiate a relationship that would be likely to put them into this predicament. 59
57. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 28
(1990). Callahan asserts that a competent, l;ut dying, patient has little right to vigorous lifeextending treatment when such treatment is not likely to be efficacious. He feels that a patient has
a right only to ask medicine to do that which is compatible with its proper goals and not to extend
a life in the face of a wholly bleak medical prognosis. He also advocates a shift in priority from an
individual-centered to a community-centered view of health and human welfare. To do this, he
would focus upon the amounts and types of health needed to collectively and communally improve
our society.
This argument was relied upon by the Oregon legislature in 1987 when it withdrew Medicaid
funding for certain organ transplants in order to divert such funds to prenatal care programs. See
Michael J. Garland, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon, I HEALTH MATRIX, J. LAw-MED.
139, 141 (1991).
58. See supra part I.
59. Siliciano notes that physicians and hospitals are free, from a legal perspective (with limited exceptions), to decline treatment to those who cannot afford the cost of care. Thus, any theoretical defense of the current unitary standard must explain how tort law can achieve its goal of
providing the same quality of care to all Americans when providers have the liability-free option
of providing no care at all to whomever they choose. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 443; see also
John J. Howard, Medical Malpractice Liability and Cost Containment: Law and Economics in
Conflict, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 309, 324 n.l24 (1988) ("[M]edical malpractice law may fail
to protect the poor . . . [because] it does not reach the major device used to withhold treatment
from the poor, i.e., preventing the physician-patient relationship from coming into existence in the
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It follows that, under the present state of the common law, the
standard of care must be flexible enough to encourage physicians to
enter into relationships with patients with marginal resources, such as
patients who are unable to pay the physician's usual fee or who live in
rural or impoverished areas that lack expensive facilities and equipment. The patient herself benefits from a flexible standard since, by
reducing the risk that the physician will be liable for malpractice for
failing to provide a treatment because of resource constraints, physicians will be encouraged to enter into and remain in the patientphysician relationship. The patient arguably is better off with some
care rather than none, even if, in the absence of resource limits, the
care the patient receives would be regarded as "substandard."
Yet this conclusion is problematic. For one thing, why would a
physician ever need to assert a resource-based defense under a flexible
approach to the standard of care? If the physician suspected that the
patient's resources would be inadequate, the physician simply would refuse to enter into a relationship with the patient in the first place. The
purpose· of the flexible-standard defense, then, must be to deal with
cases in which the physician has misjudged either the available resources or the patient's needs and has entered into a relationship that
subsequently confronts the physician with insufficient resources. 60 To
the degree that the defense of limited resources is permitted, it allows
the risk of making an erroneous resource assessment to be shifted to
the patient and encourages the physician to enter into relationships
with patients in uncertain cases-that is, where the physician is unsure
whether the available resources will be sufficient. 61
However, if the physician is allowed to shift the risk of error to the
patient as the price for agreeing to enter into the relationship, the physician is able to accomplish unilaterally what the common law of contract refused to allow him to accomplish with the patient's consent. A
flexible standard of care based on resource constraints seems at odds
first place."); Morreim, supra note 9, at 278-79 (stating that physicians must consider economic
matters when deciding which patients to treat).
60. Another possibility is that the physician declines to guess, perhaps because he thinks it is
unethical to be concerned about the patient's resources.
61. The existence of this defense helps to explain why courts regard the relationship as having
formed only when the physician agrees to treat the patient for a specific condition. See Fought v.
Solce, 821 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (no physician-patient relationship by mere phone
call to on-call physician); Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103 (Va. 1977) (relationship exists where
doctor granted "appointment at designated time and place for the performance of a specific medical service").
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with the protection afforded patients by the common law's limitation
upon the role of contract. The only difference is that under tort law, the
courts in a malpractice action occasionally will second-guess the physician's decision in order to ensure a "reasonable"-i.e., socially efficient-result, while under contract law, the parties are presumed to
achieve socially efficient results through their own private bargaining.
Our uneasiness with a flexible tort standard stems from an even
more fundamental source, however. We have been looking in the wrong
area of law for the answers, for we have yet to ask the right questions.
To understand the problem with our inquiry to this point, we need to
be more precise about the problem with which we are dealing. Thus
far, we have defined the problem in general terms. That is, we have
asked whether or not the standard of care should be flexible in l~ght of
resource constraints, and thus whether resource limits should_. be accepted as a defense to a charge of medical malpractice. But what does
it mean to allow the standard of care to be flexible in light of resource
constraints? What actual situations might it cover?
One scenario is represented by the following statement from a
physician to his patient: "As a reasonable physician, T recommend that
you receive treatment X. My fee for providing this treatment is $Y.
Unless you can pay this fee, I will not provide the treatment." In this
case, the physician and patient face a resource constraint in the form of
the patient's willingness and ability to pay. If the standard of care did
not vary according to resource constraints and the physician did not
provide the patient with treatment X, the patient could hold the physician liable for malpractice if she was injured as a result. 62 Conversely,
if the standard were allowed to reflect resource constraints, the physician might successfully defend the suit on the basis of the patient's
inability to pay. 63
Seen this way, the issue is no longer simply one of whether to recognize a resource-dependent standard of care-or, in terms of the
objectives of the tort system, whether such a standard is likely to yield
the greatest net societal benefit. Instead, the issue is whether to allow
62. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (physician undertaking an operation or
other treatment must, in absence of an agreement limiting service, continue service so long as
patient requires attention).
___63. When a patient agrees to enter into a relationship with a physician, the patient undertakes
certain duties, one of which is to pay the physician's reasonable fee. The thrust of the principle of
a unitary standard of care and cases like Ricks, however, is that the patient's failure to pay may
not entitle the physician to terminate the relationship or withhold services. Instead, the physician
may be relegated to an action for quantum meruit against the patienL
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the physician to refuse to provide medically necessary services 64 because of the physician's own self-interest in being compensated. The
law must resolve not only the conflict between the patient's self-interest
and the greater good, but also the conflict of interest between the physician and the patient. Relaxing the standard of care under these circumstances affects not only the physician's duty of care, but his duty of
loyalty. To understand the implications of this realization, we need to
look beyond the area of tort law and to apply a set of legal rules specially designed to deal with conflicts of interest of this nature: the rules
of fiduciary law.

III.

THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY LAW

While there is some lingering debate over whether the patient-physician relationship is properly termed a fiduciary relationship, 611 most
courts and commentators now agree that it is. 66 Like contractual agreements, fiduciary rules are designed to allow the parties to gain from
trade. However, these rules stem from the same concerns that led the
courts to reject direct contracting between parties for medical care: un64. The term "medically necessary" is used to indicate that the patient will suffer some significant detriment in health status if the services are not rendered.
65. A number of commentators characterize it instead as a confidential relationship. See I
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § "2.5, at 43 (4th ed. 1987)
("A confidential relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely
to exist where there is a family relationship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises
between physician and patient or priest and penitent."); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Conflicts of
Interest, Profits and Problems in Physician Referrals, 262 JAMA 390, 391 (1989) ("[O]nly some
courts and commentators declare that physicians are fiduciaries in the full sense of the term
....").
66. For example, Morreim recognizes that the question of the physician's duty under resource
constraints involves fiduciary principles, see Morreim, supra note 9, at 296-301, while two other
commentators point out that fiduciary principles provide an important basis for understanding the
nature of the patient-physician relationship, see Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 42 MERCER L. R:Ev. 989 (I 991). Cases that have ~ecognized the
fiduciary relationship include Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.) ("The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations
beyond those associated with armslength transactions."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. I 064 (1972); Salis
v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.IO (M.D. Pa. I98I) (citing Malloy v. Shanahan, 421
A.2d 803, 805-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("It is axiomatic that the physician-patient
relationship is a fiduciary one."); Mull v. Strong, 448 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984) (fiduciary duty
to refrain from disclosing information acquired during the physician-patient relationship); Petrillo
v. Syntex Lab., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill. 1986) ("[M]odern public policy strongly favors the
confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and his physician."), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (I 987).
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equal bargaining power between the parties resulting from the high
cost of patient monitoring of physician performance, due to information
·asymmetries and the "credence" nature of the physician's services. 67
Some of these factors are present in other types of transactions and
have led courts to reject the contract model in particular instances-for
example, by declaring certain agreements unconscionable. 68 In some relationships, however, the disparity of bargaining power between the
parties is so great and so embedded in the nature of the relationship
that the law not only rejects the contract model, but also imposes fiduciary duties on the stronger party. 69
Fiduciary rules respond to disparities of bargaining power in a
number of ways. First, they limit the fiduciary's freedom of action by
prohibiting him from using his superior power to take advantage of the
principaF 0 and by requiring him to act in the principal's interest.. The
physician may avoid tort liability merely by acting reasonably,nbut he
may still be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty if he fails to act
loyally. Fiduciary rules address the disparity between the parties in
other ways as well. Where the entrustor challenges her contractual
agreement or other transaction with the' fiduciary, the burden of justification is shifted from the challenging party to the fiduciary. 72 Further67. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text; see also Mehlman, supra note 26, at 36677.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 153 (1981); id. at § 208 ("(l]f a contract
or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce
the contract"). See generally Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (absence of meaningful choice in entering into unconscionable contract for the· purchase of
furniture due to inequality of bargaining power); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
69. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1064-74; DeMott, supra note 37, at 908-15;
Frankel, supra note 37, at 800-01; Healey & Dowling, supra note 66, at 1001. These authors
contend that fiduciary law has evolved in response to the recognition that there are certain legal
relationships where the conduct of the more powerful party should be subject to a higher standard
than those found in the law of contracts or torts. It is also important to note that the fiduciary
concept reflects a relationship of trust in which one party is especially vulnerable. As a matter of
public policy, the law is willing to impose further protective measures for the benefit of that party.
70. See Healey & Dowling, supra note 66, at I 003. Healey and Dowling state that the fiduciary receives his power from the entrustor and is expected to act in place of, or on behalf of, the
en trustor. In addition; the power is vested for the well-being of the en trustor and not for the use or
benefit of the fiduciary in his personal role.
71. See supra part II.
72. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1048 (once the appearance of disloyalty is
established, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove his innocence). DeMott explains that the
presence of a fiduciary obligation significantly affects the conduct of litigation through its allocation of the burden of proof. If a suit challenges a transaction between a fiduciary and a beneficiary, the fiduciary has the burden of proving that he dealt candidly and fairly with the benefi-
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more, the fiduciary may be required to do more than merely compensate the patient for the loss she suffers as a result of a breach of
fiduciary duty; punitive damages may be imposed upon the fiduciary. 73
This stems from the fact that the information disparity between the
parties lowers the probability that a breach of fiduciary duty will be
detected. Health care delivery is so complex that it is difficult. for a
patient to identify when a physician is ·acting disloyally. 74 Fiduciary
rules respond by increasing the severity of the sanction to deter a
breach of fiduciary duty.
The overall effect of these rules is to permit the patient to entrust
her welfare to a party with greater knowledge and expertise, while at
the same time minimizing the need to monitor the physician's behavior
to ensure that the physician acts in the patient's interest. As a result,
patients are able to expend more of their scarce resources on the
purchase of health care rather than on the surveillance and sanctioning
of physicians. The patient at the margin is encouraged to seek physician services rather than forego treatment because of the risk of physician misfeasance.
Fiduciary rules reduce the costs of monitoring and encourage pa~
tients to obtain care by inducing the patient to "trust" the physician.
Trust correlates to the patient's uncertainty regarding the physician's
behavior. Faced with uncertainty, the patient has three choices. She
can expend resources to monitor the physician's performance (either
directly or through third parties such as state medical boards and govciary. See DeMott, supra note 37, at 900; see also Mehlman, supra note 26, at 396 ("A fairness
criterion . . . plays an appropriate role by reflecting a skeptical attitude toward the effectiveness
of disclosure. The practical effect of this skepticism is to shift the burden of proving the adequacy
and effectivertess of disclosure from the patient to the provider.").
73. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1048 ("[l]f disloyalty is actually proved rather
than inferred, it may be appropriate for fiduciary law to increase the sanction to include punishment, not just disgorgement of the appropriated asset."). For a detailed discussion of fiduciary
remedies, see J.C. SHEPARD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 75, 82, 116-21 (1981 ). See also Hospital
Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991) (punitive damage award sustained
where patient's injuries were exacerbated by hospital's transfer policy), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1175 (1992).
74. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1049. Detecting a breach of fiduciary duty is
also complicated by the fact that the breach of duty may appear to be merely a lack of competent
performance. If a patient suffers a poor outcome as a result of something the physician did or did
not do, it is difficult for the patient to distinguish whether the physician lacked the requisite skill
or placed his own interests above those of the patient. The patient's difficulty in detecting a breach
of fiduciary duty is underscored by how rarely patients detect a lack of competent performance. A
recent study showed that only I in every 7.6 of all adverse events due to negligence resulted in
malpractice claims. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 248 (1991).
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ernment regulators); she can expend resources to requce the uncertainty, such as by learning enough about her medical condition to make
choices for herself; 75 or she can ignore the uncertainty and behave as if
she were confident that the physician-would not betray her. 76 The third
alternative constitutes "trusting''-the physician and is embodied in fiduciary doCtrine because it entails thCieast expenditure of the patient's
resources. 77
.'A fiduCiary analysis of how physicians should deal with resource
constraints addresses the effect of the denial of treatment on patient
trust.· As a fiduciary, a physician is required to act in the patient's interest. When a patient is denied treatment, however, the patient's interest is being subordinated to someone else's. According to fiduciary the- ___oty, this could cause the patient to distrust the physician, thereby
leading the patient to expend excessive resources on monitoring physician behavior or to incur the costs of illness rather than obtaining the
physician's services. In that case, the law might respond by declaring
the denial of treatment to be a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty
to his patient.
The response of the law could depend upon who possesses those
interests to which the patient's interests are subordinated. A distinction
might be drawn between sacrificing the patient's interests for the personal gain of the physician and sacrificing the patient's interests for the
benefit of other patients or society. The law might be more tolerant of
the latter because the effect on patient trust might be perceived as being slight or because other concerns were deemed to outweigh the loss
of patient trust. In order to understand the application of fiduciary doctrine under conditions of constrained resources, we must first identify
75. Reducing uncerlainty is a priinary objective of informed consent. In the extreme, the patient attempts to become a "lay doctor." See Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Interpersonal Trust, 93 AM. J. Soc. 623, 630 (1987). By becoming more informed, the patient reduces the
disparity between herself and the physician, which may deter the physician from taking advantage
of her. However, obtaining information does not necessarily promote trust; rather, it decreases the
need for trust. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc.
FORCES 967, 970 (1985) ("[l]f one were omniscient, actions could be undertaken with complete
certainty, leaving no need; or even possibility, for trust to develop . . . . Although some prior experience with the. object of tru.st is a necessary condition for establishing the cognitive element in
trust, s.uch experience only opens the door to trust without actually constituting it.").
76. The connection between trust and uncertainty has been explored by German sociologist
Niklas Luhmann, who states that trust "increases the 'tolerance of uncertainty.' " See NIKLAS
LUHMANN, TRUST ANDPOWER 15 (1979).
77. In effect, the patient decides that it is advantageous to accept a risk of being harmed by
the physician rather than expending greater resources to prevent the harm or incurring the certain
harm of foregoing the .physician's services.
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whose interest is being enhanced at the patient's expense and then address whether any circumstances justify the patient's sacrifice.
A.

Conflict Between Patient and Physician

In denying a patient access to care, a physician may face a· conflict
between his own interests and those of the patient. Subordinating the
patient's interests to his own might seem to constitute the cardinal sin
of fiduciary misbehavior and to result in clear liability for the physician. The issues are not that simple, however. For example, the physician certainly is permitted to accept a fee from the patient. Yet the
patient would arguably be better off if she could obtain the care for
free. By charging a fee, the physician might be said to be placing his
own interests above those of the patient. However, this does not necessarily constitute a violation of his fiduciary duty.
If we assume that the physician would riot willingly harm his patient unless he derived some benefit, we identify the following possibilities in, terms of the effect of the physician's behavior on his and his
patient's welfare:
Change in Welfare
Patient

Physician

Legal Rule

( 1) Decreased

Increased

Prohibited

(2) Unchanged

Increased

Prohibited

(3) Increased

Increased

Permitted

{4) Increased

Unchanged

Permitted

(5) Increased

Decreased

Permitted/
Possibly Required

The essence of the fiduciary principle is that alternative. (1) is prohibited: The fiduciary cannot advance his own interests to the detriment of the principal. A physician cannot refuse to provide a patient
with a necessary service, for example, in order to increase the physician's earnings. Some payment systems-such as so-called capitated
systems in which the physician receives a fixed amount per patient, per
month, regardless of the services the patient receives-reward physicians financially if they reduce care to their patients. If the patient can
show that care was denied solely to leave more money for the physician
at the end of the month, the physician will be liable for breach of his
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78

Arguably, alternative (2) is also prolubited: Insofar as the purpose
of the relationship is to benefit the patient, the physician should not be
permitted to use the relationship for his gain, even if doing so produces
no direct loss to the patient. One way of looking at alternative (2) is
that the physician ha~appropriated an opportunity for gain to himself,
rather than giving if to the patient. The case of Jlfoore v. Regents of
the University of California, 79 in which the California Supreme Court
held that a physician breached his fiduciary duty to his patient by commercializing the patient's cells without permission and without allowing
the patient to receive any of the financial benefit, suggests that alternative (2) would violate the physician's fiduciary duty. 80

The remaining alternatives, (3) through (5)~ are aJJ arguably permitted-that is, the physician can act in these ways without necessarily
violating his fiduciary duty to his patient. The only controversial alternative is (3). Some might think that the physician's fiduciary duty prohibits him from benefitting at all. Yet, as mentioned earlier, this is
clearly erroneous: the physician is allowed to charge the patient a fee
for his services.
To answer the question of whether the physician can refuse to provide services to the patient if the patient cannot pay the physician's fee,
it helps to rank the permissible alternatives in the order in which they
would be preferred bythe physician. The order is probably descending:
the physician would most prefer io gain along with the patient- alternative (3). For example, the physician would prefer to receive payment
in return for any health benefit provided to the patient. The physician
would be Jess interested in alternative (4), where the patient gains but
not the physician. For example, the physician would prefer to treat the
patient himself than to refer the patient to a specialist and lose his
78. See Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989) (HMO's capitation and
risk pool arrangement delayed plaintiff's referral to specialist for pap smear test and consequent
diagnosis of cancer); Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1988) (utilization review decisions used to achieve cost control constituted bad faith because they were significantly more restrictive than community standards); Joanne Wojcik, Health Plans Urged to Assess
Liability, Bus. INs., June 25, 1990, at 12 (noting that HMOs are increasingly being held liable for
injuries resulting from reduced care).
79. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
80. See id. at 483. While the facts suggest that the patient was made to suffer expense and
discomfort in order to enable the physician to profit, the opinion premises the breach of fiduciary
duty on the physician's personal interests, unrelated to the patient's health, that may affect the
physician's professional judgment, rather than on the patient's cost of the physician's behavior.
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fee. 81 The physician would least prefer alternative (5), in which the
patient gains at the physician's expense. For example, the physician
would not like to provide care for free because he would suffer an opportunity cost of being unable to treat other patients. The physician's
worst scenario under alternative (5) would require him to pay the costs
of the patient's care out of his own pocket, such as by having to pay for
the patient's hospital care to avoid a premature discharge.
The progression from alternative (3) to (5) involves the patient's
preferences as well as those of the physician. The farther down the list
the physician is required to go to fulfill his fiduciary duty to his patient,
the more the patient is benefitted at the physician's expense and the
more reason she has to trust the physician. This reduces the amount
that the patient must spend on monitoring the physician to insure that
the physician does not act in his own self-interest at the patient's
expense.
The fact that, as the patient and the physician move down the list,
the patient's welfare increases relative to the physician's, suggests that
alternatives (3) to (5) in the preceding table must be viewed as a continuum rather than as a set of clearly distinguished option.s. The question of whether the physician must treat the patient regardless of resource constraints then becomes: How far down the list must the
physician be wi11ing to go in order to fulfill his fiduciary duty to the
patient?
Based on existing case law, the answer, at present, is unclear. The
question usually arises when the patient complains that the physician
caused her harm by prematurely terminating the relationship. This
practice is known as "abandoning" the patient. 82 On the one hand, the
law permits the physician to terminate the relationship by giving the
81. In some respects, the physician may gain by the referral. Although he forgoes his fee for
this particular patient (since fee-splitting and kickbacks are illegal), the specialist may reciprocate
by referring other patients to the physician in the future. Moreover, the physician who fails to
refer a patient to a specialist risks liability for malpractice if the patient is harmed as a result. A
rational physician who decides not to refer the patient must calculate that the risk of liability and
the loss of goodwill from the specialist is outweighed by other factors. Potential factors include the
patient's benefit of continued care from the primary physician and the physician's benefit of future
fees from that particular patient. (which would be lost if the patient never returned to the physician after referral to the specialist).
82. These cases typiCally are brought as malpractice cases and do not expressly address
whether the physician has breached his fiduciary duty. However, by delineating the bounds to
which the physician must go to avoid mistreating the patient, they provide a lower limit to the
requirements of fiduciary doctrine.
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patient notice and a reasonable opportunity to obtain care elsewhere. 83
If, as some cases have suggested, a "reasonable opportunity" is defined
merely as giving the patient a-list of other physicians in the area and a
reasonable amount of time in which to contact them, 84 the physician
would seem to be able to avoid treating a nonpaying patient by terminating the relationship. On the other hand, other cases, together with
the doctrine known as the "continuoustreatm~nt" rule, 86 suggest that a
physician who agrees to treat a patient inay have to provide necessary
treatment whether or not the patient can pay for it. 86 In terms of giving
the patient who needs treatment a reasonable opportunity to obtain the
care elsewhere, we might say that the physician cannot terminate the
relationship unless he can find another physician who is willing to treat
the patient without payment, since otherwise the patient simply does
not'have a reasonable opportunity to obtain care elsewhere. This might
require the physician to absorb the cost of the patient's care himseif if
need be.
One way to determine the extent of the physician's duty to provide
treatment is to consider the effect of the physician's behavior on patient
trust. Assuming that an increase in the physician's willingness to sacrifice his own interests for his patient's will yield greater patient trust, we
might wish to tighten the physician's fiduciary obligations if we perceived a need to enhance trust, or to relax those obligations if we felt
that the degree of trust was greater than necessary. 87
Numerous surveys and commentators have noted that trust between patients and physicians has deteriorated. 88 Patients report that
83. See Payton v. Weaver, !82 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1982); Hirschman v. Saxon, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 767, 769 (Ct. App. 1966) (patient-physician relationship terminated when patient failed to
keep scheduled appointment and never returned for further treatment).
84. See Payton, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
85. The continuous treatment rule states that· a physician must continue to treat a patient
until the patient no longer requires care for the affliction that led her to initiate the relationship
with the physician, or until the relationship is otherwise terminated. See Johnson v. Vaughn, 370
S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963); see also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Physician Who
Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R.2d 432, 439 (1958) (discussing physician's right of withdrawal). However, the rule is not clear as to whether a patient's inability to pay terminates the relationship.
86. See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. -1990); Wickline v.
California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937).
87. By virtue of Axiom I, one of the costs of excessive trust would be a decrease in access. See
infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
88. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS, TRUST
AND THE PROFESSIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS 77 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al.
eds., 1991); Bill Stokes, An Uneasy Alliance: Suspicion, Skepticism and an Army of Outsiders
Threaten the Doctor-Patient Relationship - But the Condition Is Being Monitored, CHI. TRIB.,
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doctors are more interested in making money than in helping patients.89 Together with concerns over malpractice liability, the deterioration of trust between patient and physician has significantly demoralized physicians. 90 Applications to medical schools have declined. 91 The
absence of trust makes physicians long for a bygone era. As one surgeon writes, "I have come face to face with the disheartening fact that
we don't see such simple trust in our patients' eyes as often as we used
to." 92 One commentator goes so far as to state that "the position of the
physician in society has taken a 180-degree turn, from respect to
contempt." 93
Given the deterioration in trust between patients and physicians,
patients are likely to be devoting an excessive amount of resources to
monitoring physician behavior. It is difficult to measure directly how
much patients spend on monitoring physicians in attempting to detect
and prevent. breaches of fiduciary duty. 94 However, if we assume that
there is a link between malpractice actions and patient trust, 95 in that
Apr. 29, 1990, at Cl4 (Good Health Magazine); Gina Kalata, Wariness is Replacing Trust Between Healer and Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at AI; Flora Johnson Skelly, MDs and
Patients: Where Is the Trust?, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 5, 1990, at 28; Joseph D. Wassersug, Consumerism Soon Will Consume Medical Practice, AM. MED. NEWS, July 22, 1988, at 23.
89. See Kalata, supra note 88, at I.
90. See Skelly, supra note 88, at 28.
91. See Leigh Page, Medical Schools 'Enlarge Their Vision,' Embrace Humanities, AM.
MED. NEws, Jan. 5, 1990, at 28 (medical school applications at an all-time low of 1.6 applicants
for every place available). But see Leigh Page, Hike in Medical School Applicants May Boost
Standards, AM. MED. NEws, May 18, 1992, at 15 (applications appear to be increasing once
again).
92. Victor Cohn, The Question Your Doctor Doesn't Ask: Are You Satisfied?, WASH. PosT,
Feb. 20, 1990, at Zl2.
93. Wassersug, supra note 88, at 23.
94. One reason is that, as noted earlier, it is extremely difficult to distinguish a breach of
fiduciary duty from a lack of competent performance. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
If a physician denies treatment to a patient, the patient may not be able to determine whether her
subsequent condition is the result of the physician's behavior or the inevitable progression of her
underlying disease or condition. Furthermore, even if the patient realizes that she has suffered a
poor outcome due to the physician's failure to render necessary care, she may not be able to
determine whether the physician has sacrificed her interests for his own. Disentangling the effect
of the patient's illness or condition from the patient's health outcome following an episode of
medical care is the objective of the new science of outcome measurement. While progress has been
made, much work remains to be done before the results can be used to evaluate the quality of
health care services. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care:
The Impact of Outcome Measurement and Practice Standards, 18 LAW, MEo. & HEALTH CARE
368 (1990).
95. See William Y. Rial, I Have A Concern For Thee, 248 JAMA 1069, 1070 (1982) (active
cultivation of patient trust is one of the best ways to prevent malpractice suits); William B. Applegate, Physician Management of Patients With Adverse Outcomes, 146 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
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patients are more inclined to attempt to detect and remedy poor outcomes if they distrust their physicians, the widely noted increase in the
severity of malpractice actions, along with calls for reforms to reduce
the nurriber of suits and the costs of the system, support the
proposition.
If patients are spending too much on monitoring physicians, a
more efficient system could be achieved by increasing trust. In terms of
the obligation to treat patients at the physician's expense, the physician
may have to go to "heroic" lengths to provide treatment when resources are constrained. 96 The physician may be required to submit to
one or more of the following: treat the patient without charge, lower his
fee to cover only his "cost," accept whatever the patient can afford to
pay, or allow the patient to pay the fee over an extended period. H the
physician terminates treatment without offering the patient .these alternatives and thereby harms the patient, the physician might be open to
the charge that he breached his fiduciary duty by placing his own interests above his patient's. 97
2249 (! 986) (trust is enhanced by constant communication anrl joint decision making between
doctor and patient; when trust is impaired, patient may blame physician for a poor outcome,
thereby creating potential for a malpractice suit); Irwin Press et al., Satisfied Patients Can Spell
Financial Well-Being, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Feb. 1991, at 34 (reduced trust can yield a
negative attitude toward care provider and a predisposition to perceive actual harm; studies show
that patients view healing favorably if service interaction was good, regardless of the actual
healing).
96. Barry Furrow calls this a "duty to rescue." Barry Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of Health Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX, J. LAW-MED.
(forthcoming 1993). However, the rules of tort law regarding this duty suggest that it does not
require the actor to expose himself to personal risk. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 324
cmt. d {1965). Thus, since a fiduciary may have to risk a loss of compensation to fulfill his duty to
his patient, it is preferable to describe the physician's duty as "heroism" rather than as "rescue"
behavior.
97. It might be questioned whether patient trust would in fact be enhanced by tightening
fiduciary rules for physicians. Patients might discount physician behavior on the basis that the
physicians' actions were the result of a fear of legal sanctions rather than a desire to promote their
patients' interests.
Several commentators appear to suggest that legal rules are a functional substitute for trust
in professionals, in that both allow patients to reduce their monitoring costs. Shapiro caiis this
"impersonal trust." See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 634 (in impersonal trust, reliance is placed on
"guardians" and on their monitoring and control mechanisms). According to this approach, patients turn to legal regulation to sustain their relationships with physicians when they feel that
trust in the physicians themselves is no longer warranted. For example, Bernard Barber states
that, in relation to trust, law is an "alternative and complementary mechanism of social control,"
adding that "we need to discover and continually rediscover how to foster trust and make it more
effective . . . . [P]aradoxically, this goal can be achieved in part by making its social control
alternatives and complements more extensive and more effective." BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF TRUSTS 22, 170 (1983). Similarly, Mark Granovetter states that institutional ar-
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The heroic behavior demanded of the physician in fulfilling his fiduciary duty assumes a different appearance if the source of resource
constraints is another party rather than the physician himself. Even if
the physician agrees to waive his fee, a hospital may not be willing to
admit a patient who is uninsured, a specialist may not be willing to
accept a referral, or a piece of necessary medical equipment may not
be found in the area. In these situations, we might say that the physician has done all that is required once he agrees to waive his fees. To
increase trust, however, the physician may need to go further by serving as an advocate for his patient. In Wickline v. State, 98 for example,
the court suggested that the physician had a responsibility to protest a
rangements that make it too costly to malfease "do not produce trust but instead are a functional
substitute for it." Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 489 (1985). In contrast, Shapiro argues that the mechanisms
of impersonal trust enhance trust in agents, and that only those strategies that "virtually eliminate
agency and uncertainty are functional substitutes for trust." See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 636
n.18.
However, some commentators are concerned that reliance on legal rules may impair the patient-physician relationship. For example, philosopher Annette Baier states: "Where the truster
relies on his threat advantage to keep the trust relation going, or where the trusted relies on
concealment, something is morally rotten in the trust relationship." Annette Baier, Trust and
Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 255 (1986).
Furthermore, those who claim that reliance on the threat of the law is a functional equivalent
to trust ignore the fact that parties turn to legal controls only when trust has deteriorated. Thus,
reliance on the threat of sanctions constitutes a reflection of distrust rather than an equivalent to
trust: the greater the role of this threat in facilitating a relationship, the greater the breakdown of
trust and the level of distrust between the parties.
Barber appears to accept the relationship between reliance on legal sanctions and distrust
when he endorses the principle of "rational distrust," which he describes as "rationally based
expectations that technically competent performance and/or fiduciary obligation and responsibility will not be forthcoming." BARBER, supra, at 166. According to Barber, this type of distrust is
not destructive, but instead is "another, and in a sense functionally equivalent, instrument for
maintaining social order." !d. As a reflection of distrust, however, the threat of legal sanction may
erode trust in much the same way that 'distrust breeds distrust. Pellegrino observes that parties
embrace "ethical minimalism" when they rely upon law: "Patients must seek strict contractual
r~lationships with their doctors . . . . Professionals will tend to limit themselves to the precise
letter of agreement." Pellegrino, supra note 88, at 79. This in turn gives rise to an "ethics of
distrust," in which "professionals and those who seek their help assume primarily a self-protective
stance." !d.
The concern that reliance on legal rules produces distrust is based on the notion that the
function of legal rules is to punish misbehavior and that physicians will act upon fear rather than
concern for patients. However, the law can play a more positive role: uncertainty may be reduced
by reflecting a consensus on the standards of physician behavior. This consensus can be reached
through a process that includes input from public and private groups, particularly from the medical profession itself. In this light, the law becomes more a code of conduct than a mere threat of
punishment, with trust enhanced rather than destroyed.
98. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986).
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third-party payer's refusal to pay for additional days of hospitalization
for his patient. 99 Morreim similarly has argued that "under current economic conditions, [a patient's] needs also encompass economic advocacy . . . . The patient . . . needs the physician's vigorous lobbying efforts, such as to persuade recalcitrant utilization reviewers of the
necessity of treatment." 100 vVhere resources are lacking in a geographic
area, the physician's fiduciary duty may require him to lobby providers
and payers to secure the resources; likewise, a rural physician may be
obligated to try to convince a legislature or state health department to
build a clinic in his area or to fund regional access to an advanced
medical technology such as magnetic resonance imaging. At a minimum, the physician must alert the patient to the need for the resource.
A physician incurs numerous costs in trying to eliminate barriers
to treatment created by third parties. Lobbying takes time awayJrom
his practice. Kn addition, a physician who pressures a third party such
as a payer or hospital on behalf of his patient is likely to be unpopular
with that party. A hospital or HMO may take administrative action
against the physician, such as attempting to revoke his hospital staff
privileges or to exclude him from the HMOs panel of physicians.
Nonetheless, the physician might be obligated to undertake an advocacy role on behalf of his patients despite these risks.
B.

Conflict Between Patients

Thus far, we have only considered the conflict between the physician's self-interest and the interests of his patient. However; resource
constraints may also affect physician behavior when one patient's interests are pitted against those of another patient, a group of patients, or
society as a whole.
An example of one patient's interests being pitted against those of
another is cost shifting. This occurs when a physician increases the
charges for one patient or group of patients to cover the costs of treating other patients who are indigent or lack health insurance, or whose
insurance pays less than the physician's fee. 101 From the standpoint of
99. !d. at 670. The court noted that a physician cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for his
patient's care by simply complying without protest with limitations imposed by a third-party payer
when the physician's medical judgment dictates otherwise. Id. at 671. Thus, the court concluded
that Wickline's physician should have attempted to prolong her hospital stay beyond the authorized time period if he determined that such additional care was in her best interest. !d.
100. Morreim, supra note 9, at 292.
101. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 448 ("[H]ospitals· and physicians routinely overcharged
some patients to finance the care of other patients . . . ."); Gerard F. Anderson, All-Payer
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tort law, we might say that the physician is entitled to shift costs so
long as he maximizes societal welfare, and he may even be required to
do so in order to act "reasonably." Cost shifting is comparable to
spreading the costs of accidents, a primary function of tort liability and
one that is generally agreed to be desirable. 102 In terms of the physician's fiduciary duties to his patients, the physician might be deemed to
be acting heroically by providing services to those who otherwise would
not receive them because of resource constraints. At the same time,
however, the physician is sacrificing the interests of one group of patients for those of another. It is unclear whether this is consistent with
the physician's common law duties.
As a practical matter, cost shifting might not be problematic if the
burden on those who are made to pay is hidden or small. However,
difficulties arise if the effect is to deny treatment to the patients who
must absorb the costs. This consequence is bound to occur at the margin. As the loss of benefit to the patients who must bear the cost increases and becomes more visible, the physician would likely be subject
to greater risk of liability for violating his fiduciary duty. to those patients who were denied services because the resources necessary to provide those services were diverted to other patients. 103
Yet as John Siliciano points out, this issue is becoming moot.
Third-party payers increasingly are refusing to absorb the costs of providing health care services to patients who are not their enrollees. 104
Rateseiting: Down But Not Out, 1991 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 35, 37 (describing a reduction in the level of cost shifting as one benefit of ratesetting); Deborah S. Pinkney, Report Details
Increased Cost Shifting by Hospitals, Ali!. MED. NEws, June I, 1992, at 8 (noting that an increase in cost shifting "threatens the stability of health care").
102. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970) (advocating cost shifting); JoHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 8-13 (1967) (cost shifting and cost spreading);
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961) (exploring justifications of risk distribution).
·
103. The common law does not seem to provide a clear answer to the physician's dilemma.
There are no cases in the health law area that illuminate the issue. However, it is interesting to
note that the recent Oregon Medicaid legislation contains a provision that immunizes physicians
from legal liability for denying patients medically necessary services when those services are not
covered by the state plan. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Under the Oregon plan,
certain services are denied coverage in order to expand the number of persons eligible for Medicaid benefits. Thus, the plan resembles cost shifting by denying some services to some patients so
that other services can be provided to other patients within the resource constrai.nts set by the
legislature. The fact that the legislature added the immunization provision suggests that physicians might otherwise be liable at common law if they denied services to some of their patients in
order to benefit others.
104. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 453-57. Siliciano states:
Because DRG reimbursement payments are set simply by category of diagnosis, there is
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Soon, physicians will no longer be able to discharge their duty to act
heroically by simply shifting costs. Instead, they will have to sacrifice
their own interests to benefit their patients-such as by waiving their
fees.
Thus, we find ourselves back at the point where the physician's
interests conflict with the patient's. 100 Once again, if the objective is to
increase patient trust, the physician may be expected to perform heroically by sacrificing his own interests for those of his patients.
Conflicts between patients competing for scarce resources can occur in ways that do not so clearly involve the physician's own selfinterest. One type of case is "absolute scarcity," in which there is an
immediate shortage of resources that canno~ be alleviated by allocating
additional funds or by reallocating existing resources. For example,
when a single transplant organ becomes available and there· is more
than one patient on the waiting list, some method must be used to decide who will receive the organ. The interests of the patients denied the
organ will necessarily be sacrificed to the interests of the patient who
receives it. Another illustration of absol~te scarcity is triage, in which
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ment than can be treated by the physicians available. As in the transplant example, some method must be used to determine priority of
treatment. 106 The triage physician and the transplant surgeon who has
more than one patient on a waiting list might be accused of violating
no possibility cif assessing surplus charges against some patients in order to subsidize the
care of others who are not similarly covered by some form of health insurance . . . .
[L]ittle or no portion of the DRG payment under most systems represents an allocation
for the free treatment of indigent patients.
Jd. at' 453-54. He further states that the health care system's ability to provide uncompensated
care is also undercut by HMOs and the remaining potential subsidizers who are Jess willing, under
current market conditions, to accept the charges assessed by a health care provider attempting to
finance care for the indigent. /d. at 454-55.
!05. To the extent that physicians shift costs in order to continue to receive their fees, cost
shifting pits patients against the physician's self-interest as well as against each other. Unless costs
are shifted to obtain resources to enable the patient to receive care from another provider after the
physician has already acted heroically by reducing or waiving his fee, the practice of cost shifting
may be said to contain an inherent conflict between physicians and patients.
106. For a general discussion of this issue, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive
Medical Treatmellls, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 239. Absolute scarcity results in an absolute shortage at
the micro level due to the necessity of a short-term allocation decision. However, the shortage may
be alleviated for the long term through a reallocation of resources at the macro level. For example, more transplant organs might be available if donors received payment, a transaction currently
prohibited under federal law. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
Similarly, triage might be avoided if more physicians were available in the first place.
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their fiduciary duty to the patients who are denied treatment. 107 However, the circumstances compel the physician to make a choice. The
only alternative to that choice is to permit all the battlefield casualties
and accident victims to die, or to allow the organ to go to waste.
It would hardly seem appropriate for the common law to subject a
physician to automatic liability for breach of his fiduciary duty if he
treats patients under conditions of absolute scarcity. However, the common law provides little guidance on how he should decide which patients to treat. Some commentators have suggested that patients be selected on the basis of social worth criteria. 108 That is, priority would be
given to those expected to make the greatest contribution to society.
This approach actually was employed to allocate access to kidney dialysis in the 1960s,109 but was widely condemned.U 0 Another method
would give the physician wide discretion and protect him from liability
as long as he did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory
fashion. For example, the physician might use medical criteria to select
patients on the basis of which patient was in worse condition or which
patient stood the best chance of survival. 111 This resembles a sort of
"business judgment rule" that is sometimes used to insulate corporate
directors from liability to shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty. 112
107. For this reason, as well as to avoid biased decisions, the government has established a
system for selecting transplant organ recipients that does not involve the patients' physicians in
the decision-making process. First, all potential recipients must be listed on the United Network
for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") waiting list. Then, a point system is utilized to determine the allocation of organs. Points are received in accordance with such factors as time spent on the waiting
list, quality of match to the donor's organ, existence of certain antibodies, medical urgency, and
ease and rapidity of performance of the transplant. See generally ORGAN TRANSPLANT POLICY:
IssuEs AND PROSPECTS (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989).
!08. See, e.g., Leo Shatin, Medical Care and the Social Worth of a Man, 36 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 96, 98 (1966) (criteria should include economic productivity, age, history of antisocial behavior, and contributions to humanity).
!09. See, e.g., David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag:
Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REv. 357, 377 (1968).
110. The best known criticism was that of Sanders and Dukeminier, who stated that the policies of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, which selected patients in part on the basis of social
worth, ruled out "creative nonconformists, who rub the bourgeoisie the wrong way but who historically have contributed so much to the making of America. The Pacific Northwest is no place for
a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys." !d. at 378.
Ill. These two alternatives do not lead to the same patients being selected or to the same
results in terms of success. When one hospital changed its method of allocatfng access to beds in
the intensive care unit from favoring those patients in the most critical condition to those patients
who had the best chance of surviving, the mortality rate dropped from 80% to 20%. See Note,
Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 620, 655-56 & n.l88 (1969).
112. The most extreme example in the corporate law field is Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919
(Del. 1956). In that case, a shareholder claimed that a director who served on multiple corporate
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Another approach would ignore differences between patients and allocate scarce resources randomly, such as by casting lotsY 3 In contrast
to employing medical criteria, random selection is arbitrary and might
lead to odd, non-utilitarian results, such as providing a scarce resource
to a convicted criminal rather than to a head of state. However, by
tending to ignore differences between patients based on social status or
wealth, .both medically based and raJ1dom decision making might be
less likely to erode patient trust than ailocating resources based on social worth.
In other situations involving conflicts between patients, the lack of
resources may not be absolute, and the physician may actually be able
to provide treatment to competing patients. Under such conditions, the
physician's decision not to provide treatment to a patient may be
termed a case of "relative scarcity": health care for an indivi9ual patient is limited by the desire to devote resources to other patients or to
societal uses other than health care. For example, the physician may
decide that the benefit of treatment to patient A is greater than the
benefit to patient B. He may further determine that the treatment
should only be given to A in order to conserve societal resources and
thereby ensure that patients like A received the treatment in the future.
This approach is advocated by some commentators as a partial remedy
for skyrocketing health care costsY 4
In many instances of "relative scarcity," the physician will be actboards had violated his fiduciary duty to. one of the companies when he steered an investment
opportunity to the other companies. The court rejected the claim, stating that the companies must
have known that the defendant served on a number of boards and could not direct every corporate
opportunity to all of them. The court observed that "[i]f it was his fiduciary duty, upon being
offered any investment opportunity, to submit it to a corporation of which he was a director, the
questimi arises, Which corporation?" !d. at 924. One commentator has argued that, in a situation
of absolute scarcity created by a unique corporate opportunity, a director who serves on more than
one corporate board should disclose the opportunity to each corporation and allow them to compete with one another for it. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REv. 765, 770-71
(1961).
The "business judgment" or discretionary approach seems similar to Morreim's suggestion
that physicians be required to act "reasonably" with regard to resource limits. See Morreim,
supra note 9, at 308. Although her reasonableness approach might allow the physician to violate
his fiduciary duty to patients by sacrificing individual patient interests for utilitarian goals or the
physician's own self-interest, it might be appropriate under conditions of absolute scarcity.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383) (in determining who to throw overboard from sinking lifeboat, a court "can conceive of no
mode so consonant both to humanity and to justice" as casting lots).
114. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE 202-12 (1990) (arguing that society
should set outer limits on individual entitlements to health care, but leave physicians free to apply
the standards within those boundaries in individual cases).
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ing at least in part out of his own self-interest. For example, he may
decide to provide care to one patient who is willing to pay more than
another potential recipient of care. Likewise, he may deny treatment to
a patient in order to appease a third-party payer who is concerned
about costs. In these situations; the physician might be deemed to be
violating his fiduciary duty to the patient denied treatment; the fact
that the physician's self-interest coincided with the interests of other
patients or. of society should not excuse him from behaving heroically
on behalf of all of his patients.
However, it is also possible that a denial of treatment will not promote the physician's self-interest. The physician may feel that it is his
duty to society, or to the beneficiaries of an insurance or entitlement
plan such as Medicare, to refrain from providing expensive treatments
to certain patients because the resources are needed for other patients
or for non-healtJ:l purposes. Indeed, in denying the treatment, the physician may in fact be sacrificing his own self-interest by foregoing his fee.
The physician's behavior seems selfless. He may believe that' he is acting reasonably because, by saving money, he is maximizing the efficient
use of scarce resources. Yet is he acting consistently with his fiduciary
duties to his patients? 115 The answer depends on whether or not the
physician's behavior erodes patient trust and encourages patients to
devote excessive resources to monitor the physician's behavior, resulting
in an inefficient patient-physician relationship. It seems likely that a
patient denied necessary medical treatment for the benefit of another
patient or a third-party payer will feel betrayed. Patient trust can be
enhanced, therefore, by prohibiting this type of behavior as a breach of
the physician's fiduciary duty.
In summary, the goal of fiduciary doctrine is to reduce monitoring
costs by promoting trust. To promote trust, fiduciary rules require the
115. One analogy arises in the case of corporate directors who divert corporate earnings from
shareholders to non-shareholder constituencies. The well-known case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), held that such diversion did not necessarily violate the directors'
fiduciary duty to shareholders, although it was ultra vires under the articles of incorporation in
question. Approximately 28 states have enacted so-called "other constituency" statutes which permit a diversion of corporate earnings if the interests promoted by the diversion bear some beneficial relationship to the interests of shareholders. See generally Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1991).
Another analogy arises in trust Jaw when a trustee distributes trust assets· to selected beneficiaries where such distribution is not specifically authorized by the trust instrument. While the
Jaw is very murky on this issue, it appears that the trustee must secure the consent of the disadvantaged beneficiaries in order to avoid liability. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 110 (6th ed.
1987).
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physician to further his patients' interests. The rules significantly constrain the physician's ability to act on his own behalf or to sacrifice the
welfare of individual patients for benefits to other patients or other constituencies. It is generally acknowledged that trust between patients
and physicians has eroded; this translates into a corresponding increase
in monitoring costs. This condition suggests that, in order to enhance
trust and reduce monitoring costs, fiduciary rules in the patient-physician relationship should be applied vigorously, interpreted strictly, or
botb.
Yet we have not taken into account Axiom 1. 116 . Axiom 1 gives
physicians the freedom to decide wh~n to enter into relationships with
patients. The more that physicians are constrained by fiduciary obligations from acting in their own self-interest, and the more that they feel
caught between their fiduciary obligations to specific patients and their
perceived obligations to other constituencies, the less willing they may
be to enter into relationships with those patients who are likely to create these sorts of conflicts, or the more they will insist on being paid.
Increasing trust therefore may decrease access, particularly for those
patients who are likely to consume significant amounts of health care
resources or to have fewer resources available to them by virtue of their
poverty, their location in underserved areas; or their lack of health insurance. Fiduciary rules create a tension between trust and access. The
fact that we impose fiduciary rules on a relationship means that we are
willing to sacrifice access to some degree in order to increase the value
of the relationship to the weaker party: fiduciary rules only protect
those patients fortunate enough to fin~ physicians willing to treat them.
This would not be a problem if patients enjoyed an abundance of
access. In that case, if we felt that the amount of trust between patients
and physicians was suboptim.al, we could tighten fiduciary rules and not
worry about a decrease in access. Yet access is a critical problem for
many Americans without health insurance, and an increasing problem
for insured persons whose coverage is shrinking relative to insurance
costs. Similarly, our dilemma would be alleviated if we were not concerned about health care costs. VIe could increase trust by imposing
higher duties on providers and compensating them for the increased
value of the relationship to patients. Yet cost containment has become
a social imperative. 117 The question, then, is: Can we tighten fiduciary
116. See supra part I.
117. Some commentators maintain that we can afford to spend even more on health care than
is currently spent. See, e.g., Eli Ginzberg, High Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs,
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obligations on physicians to enhance trust without sacrificing access
and exacerbating the problem of scarce resources? 118 In short, can we
eliminate Axiom 1?
IV.

CHANGING THE CoMMON LAw

Axiom 1 poses a threat to patient access by allowing physicians to
refuse to enter into a relationship with those prospective patients to
whom the physician may be required to provide services without compensation or at the physician's expense. One way to eliminate the
threat from Axiom 1 is to change the common law to make it illegal
for the physician to refuse to enter into a relationship with a patient.
This would shift the role of contract a further step away from the direct interaction between patients and physicians: contract rules-which
are not allowed to govern the terms of the relationship under current
law-would no longer be permitted to govern the formation of the relationship. A role for contract would remain, however: contract would
still govern entry into the profession. While a physician could not refuse to treat a patient, a person could refuse to become a physician,
perhaps because he disliked the coercive regime under which he would
be forced to practice.
In the extreme, a physician who rejected a potential patient could
be subjected to criminal penalties or disciplinary action-perhaps in"
eluding the loss of his license to practice. A less severe approach would
make the physician liable in tort for actual damages sustained by the
patient as the result of not being treated. A middle ground would permit the patient to recover punitive as well as actual damages on the
theory that the physician breached his fiduciary duty to the patient by
263 JAMA 1820, 1822 (1990) ("There is nothing inherently bad about the expenditure of $620
billion on health care services by a $5 trillion economy. Nor is there any reason a $6 to $7 trillion
economy should not spend $1 trillion or even more for its health care.").
118. IL might be objected that the degree of fiduciary duty imposed by the law should not
affect access. In the absence or relaxation of fiduciary rules, patients would need to expend greater
resources on monitoring physicians to prevent overcharging, and these resources would not be
available to purchase access. Conversely, increasing fiduciary obligations may allow patients to
divert resources from monitoring physicians to purchasing additional services, but it also encourages physicians to demand more for their services or to avoid entering into conflict-laden or less
remunerative relationships. Either approach would threaten access.
However, it has already been noted that the excessive cost of monitoring the behavior of a
party with greater bargaining power provides the justification for creating a fiduciary relationship.
See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. Accordingly, it is cheaper to promote trust than to
monitor physician behavior. Thus, assuming that the patient-physician relationship is formed, reducing monitoring costs by promoting trust is likely to be more efficient than promoting access by
relaxing fiduciary rules (and thereby increasing monitoring costs).
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not entering into the relationship; in effect, this would extend the physician's tort and fiduciary obligations beyond the confines of the relationship to precede its formation. 119
As a result, the physician's cost of refusing to enter into the relationship would be increased by the degree of the sanction multiplied by
the probability that it will be imposed. Ideally, this cost would be set
slightly higher than the cost to the physician of fulfilling his fiduciary
responsibilities to his patients. A sanction consisting of punishment by
the government-either through criminal penalties or disciplinary action by state medical boards-would amount to the physician being coerced into treating patients. The same effect would be achieved if the
sanction took the form of a civil remedy for injured patients, although
the appearance of coercion would be diminished.
This approach draws a immber of criticisms. The common law
generally resists forcing people to provide services to others. 120 The concern is that the provider of services will respond by degrading his performance. If we hold price constant by refusing to increase payment to
physicians in return for strict fulfillment of their fiduciary responsibilities, such as by making it impossible for them to shift costs, and if at
the same time we make it prohibitively expensive for them to refuse to
provide services at all by sanctioning them if they do so, the only remaining variable to manipulate is the quality of their services. The result is that patients may indeed obtain access, but to a lower quality of
care. A voiding this result would require additional monitoring of physicians (for example, additional malpractice actions) at an additional
cost. Such monitoring might be particularly expensive because of the
inherent difficulty in distinguishing between poor-quality care that results from lack of competent performance (for which the physician is
only liable for compensatory damages) and poor-quality care that results from the physician's resistance to coercion (for which the physi119. The nature and severity of the penalty would depend on the difficulty of detecting and
processing misbehavior. Criminal penalties might be preferred over civil penalties if the government could monitor and respond to physician.misbehavior mere cheaply than patients could. Likewise, a more severe penalty might be desired to maintain an adequate level of deterrence if violations were difficult to detect and punish.
120. The court in Hutchinson Gas & Fuel Co. v. Wichita Natural Gas Co., 267 F. 35 (8th
Cir. 1920), set forth the "general rule that specific performance of a contract will not ordinarily
be decreed by a court . . . in favor of a party against whom that court cannot efficiently compel
its performance." Id. at 39. Similarly, the court in Bickford v. Davis, 11 F. 549 (C.C.D.N.H.
1882), rejected specific performance when the defendant contracted to use his skill and machinery
to manufacture exclusively for the plaintiff a certain article in quantities plaintiff should order,
due to the impossibility of the defendant's compliance and the one-sidedness of the contract.
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cian may be additionally subjected to punitive damages, disciplinary
action, or criminal punishment). 121
Another problem raised by forcing physicians to treat patients is
ensuring that the burden of limited resources is spread fairly among all
practitioners. Physicians who practice in areas with fewer resources or
poorer patient populations would bear a disproportionate share of the
burden unless some method were employed to keep track of the provision of "coerced" care and to reapportion the burden more evenly. 122
Despite its problems, this approach has been adopted by the federal government. Legislation enacted in 1989 prohibits physicians (and
hospitals) from turning patients away from emergency rooms unless the
patient is stable or another hospital has agreed to accept a transfer of
the patient. 123 A Texas physician was recently convicted of violating
this statute and was fined $20,000. 124
Thus far, coercive legislation has been limited to emergency situations. The theory may be that quality is a lesser concern in these cases
because in an emergency any care is better than no care at all. However, several states are considering requiring physicians to treat Medicare and Medicaid patients even in non-emergency circumstances. 125
121. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1052-53 (observing that punitive damages are
necessary to deter adequately violations of fiduciary duties).
122. This coercive approach must go further. Even if the law prohibited a doctor from refusing to treat Medicare or Medicaid patients, the physician could escape this prohibition by opening
his practice in an aflluent area where there would be few or none of these patients. To solve this
problem, British Columbia initiated a policy to issue billing numbers to physicians. This policy
was designed to permit the province to control both the total numbe~ of physicians able to bill the
Medical Service Plan of British Columbia and their geographic location. For example, newly
graduating physicians trained in British Columbia would be required to apply for privileges. Once
privileges were gained, the applicants would receive a geographically restricted billing number.
See Morris L. Barer, Regulating Physician Supply: The Evo/ution.of British Columbia's Bill 41,
13 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 1 (1988).
123. See supra note 47.
124. See Sullivan v. Bur.ditt, 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a failure to weigh
medical risks and benefits before ordering transfer of severely hypertensive woman in active labor
violated the statute).
125. A new California Act would require all doctors to accept 15 Medicare and Medicaid
patients for every 100 in their care. See California Health Care Crisis Spawns Initiatives, Proposals, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 634 (Apr. 13, 1992). In addition, the Minnesota House
of Representatives proposed a health care bill requiring doctors to treat Medicare patients if they
accept patients from other government programs. See Rogers Worthington, Minnesota Pushing
Health Coverage For All, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5; 1992, at Cl. In Massachusetts, the Foundation
Health Corporation contracted to administer a new Medicaid program. Under this program, each
Medicaid recipient will be assigned a primary care doctor, and all HMOs that write health insurance will be required to accept Medicaid business. See Mike Pulley, Foundation Steams Ahead
With U.S., State Contracts, Bus. J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 4.
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Given: the problems with a coercive approach, we might search for
other ways to eliminate the impact of scarce resources on the patientphysician relationship. Instead of placing the responsibility on the individual physician to provide access despite resource constraints, the responsibility might be shifted to the state. Access would no longer be an
issue to be resolved by physicians at the micro level, ·but a problem to
be addressed at-th~ macro level through government decision making:
The government-r-ather than the physician would determine the services
to which patients were entitled, either directly through a government
program such as Medicare or a national health care financing system
as in Britain or Canada, or indirectly by specifying those health benefits that must be included in private insurance plans.
A thorough discussion of the merits of p.roviding access through
government health care programs is beyond the scope of this Artiple. A
few comments are in order, however, concerning the effect that shifting
the responsibility for access from the micro to the macro level would
have on patient trust.
In the first place, it is not clear that relying on government to determine the access to which the patient was entitled would relieve the
. physician of his fiduciary duty to his patient and the corresponding risk
of liability. If the government merely established those costs for which
it (or private insurers) would pay, the approach would resemble payment limits imposed by a third-party payer. Just as the refusal of payment by a third-party payer does not relieve the physician of his obligation to act on his patient's behalf, the physician facing payment limits
imposed by the state might still be expected to act heroically on behalf
of his patient, such as by providing noncovered services for free or by
pressuring the government or other third-party payers to pay for the
services in marginal cases. To avoid this, the physician might invoke his
privilege under Axiom 1 to refuse to treat patients who are likely to
create this type of problem, once again creating the access problem
that government intervention was designed to solve.
To avoid this result, it would be necessary to insulate the pllysician
from liability for refusing to provide services to a patient when the services were not covered by the government program. This approach was
taken by the legislature in Oregon. Under the Oregon plan, a priority
ranking of medical services was constructed by a state commission. The
state legislature then decided how far down the list it could afford to go
in order to provide some degree of health care to all persons with incomes below the federal poverty level. To avoid the Axiom 1 problem,
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the legislation included a provision immunizing physicians from liability for failing to provide services that are not funded by the legislature.126 As a result, the Oregon approach permits the physician to shift
his loyalty from the patient to the state. The patient in turn shifts his
trust from the physician to the state.
In terms of effect upon monitoring costs, it cannot be taken for
granted that placing the responsibility for access in government will
reduce such costs. Surveys show that people distrust government-probably much more than they distrust physicians. 127 Even if
government functions in accordance with the law, people may fear that
government will sacrifice individual interests for societal objectives in
much the same way as tort rules. 128 Monitoring governmental activity
might take different forms than monitoring the behavior of individual
physicians-11uch as lobbying legislators, learning how to work the administrative process, and so on-but it may not be cheaper. Furthermore, patients are likely to continue to monitor physicians-for example, to ensure that the physician is providing all the treatment that the
government has authorized, or that the physician is not furthering his
own interest at the expense of the patient's. 129 The costs of monitoring
126. See OR. REv. STAT. § 414.745 (Supp. 1992) ("Any health care provider or plan contracting to provide services to the eligible population under [this Act] shall not be subject to
criminal prosecution, civil liability or professional disciplinary action for failing t~ provide a service which the Legislative Assembly has not funded . . . ."). For a general discussion of the
Oregon plan, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL (1992); The "Oregon Plan": A Symposium, I HEALTH MATRIX, J.
LAW-MED. 135 (1991). It is not clear that physicians will take advantage of the immunity provided by the legislature. Fears have been expressed that physicians in Oregon will attempt to
provide uncovered services to their patients by characterizing the services as "above the line"
covered services.
127. There is a basic distrust of government in this country. A majority of citizens would
prefer that the government provide care only for those unable to afford it. See Christine Woolsey,

Health Care Reform Plans; Most Americans Want Private Sector to Continue Control Over
Medical Care, Bus. INs., June 8, 1992, at 1. Public opinion surveys around the nation have also
registered distrust and disgust at the process by which lawmakers are elected and govern, see
Nancy Gibbs, Keep the Bums In, TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 32, particularly with respect to the
government's ability to spend money wisely. See Jeffrey A. Perlman, Watchdogs Vie to Oversee
'M' Funds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1990, at Bl (voter approval of Citizens' Oversight Committee to
monitor government spending of tax money raised for transportation projects).
128. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
129. The manner in which the physician might take advantage of the patient under a government program Would depend, among other things, on how the physician was compensated. A
physician who was paid a set amount per patient regardless of the services he rendered would have
an incentive to provide as few services as possible to keep his costs down relative to his revenue. A
physician on salary would have an incentive to shirk. A physician paid a set amount on a fee-forservice basis would have an incentive to deny services if their costs were high relative to the
'
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1n

physicians would be incurred
addition to the costs of monitoring the
government, and together they could increase the overall costs of the
system.
Even if monitoring costs do not increase, the more that government is entrusted with the task of assuring access to health care and
allowed to usurp the fiduciary functions of the medical profession, the
more that the professional role of physicians will diminish. Instead of
professionals, they will become bureaucrats, mere administrators of
government programs.
To avoid this, physicians must resort to enhancing their status as
members of a group of professionals. If the profession collectively undertakes to ensure that the needs of patients are met at the same time
that costs are contained, both access and trust might be enhanced.
Trust in the profession as a whole would help replace trust in inqividual
practitioners. Indeed, an effective collective response by the profession
to the problems of access, cost, and trust could obviate the need for
extensive governmental intervention in the patient-physician relationship. An approach at the level of the profession as a whole also would
be consistent with the effort to eliminate Axiom 1. The profession
would define rules for itself, and people would be free to refuse to become members of the profession if they felt unable to live by those
rules. Contract would still govern entry into the profession.
The organized medical profession has taken some strides in this
direction. The American Medical Association ("AMA") has abandoned its unwillingness to consider government financing of health care
and has begun to explore government-supported methods of expanding
access. 130 The AMA also participated in the development of the new
payment system for physicians under Medicare that reallocates payments among different groups within the profession in ways that might
reduce physician payment for the patient's benefitJ 31 Organized
amount of payment and to provide profitable services of little or no net benefit to the patient in
order to inflate his net revenue.
i30. See hmes S. Todd et ai., Heaith Access America-Strengthening the U.S. Heaith Care
System, 265 JAMA 2503 (1991); AMA, HEALTH ACCESS AMERICA REANEMENTS, REPORT TO
THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, CHICAGO. ILL. (1991); see also George D. Lundberg, National Health
Care Reform: The Aura of Inevitability Intensifies, 267 JAMA 2521 (1992).
131. The Resource Based Relative Value System ("RBRVS") was developed by the AMA
and a Harvard group to create a better fee system. See Victor Cohn, Deciding What Doctors Are
Worth, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 1992, at Z9; AMA Bd. of Trustees, AMA Policy on the ResourceBased Relative Value Scale and Related Issues, 261 JAMA 2386 (1989). Once the specifics of
the RBRVS program were determined there was much dissent in the medical field. Many physician groups opposed the plan and its acceptance by the AMA, thereby causing a split between the
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medicine mustnow accept the need for physicians to sacrifice their own
individual self-interest for the interests of patients and press for a just
approach to allocating available health care resources. 182 If the profession as a whole is to retain its role as a profession, it must act boldly
and quickly in this direction.

AMA and those groups. Due to this split, the AMA has changed its view and now criticizes the
RBRVS proposal. The AMA said that it' would withdraw its support of RBRVS-based payments
for physicians if there were not appropriate adjustments to the dollar conversion factor. See Rep.
Stark Urging Compromise on Medicare Payment Conversion Factor, THE GRAY SHEET (F.D.C.
Reports, Inc.), July 1, 1991, at 23. As a result of the criticism levied against the RBRVS proposal, Medicare expects to spend seven billion more dollars on its program. See joanne M. Judge, A
Path Through the Mine Field, 45 HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT. 10 (1991).
132. It has been asserted that professional groups (including physicians) should improve the
status and prestige of their profession by engaging in work for the public interest. See George D.
Lundberg & Laurence Bodine, Fifty Hours for the Poor, 262 JAMA 3045 (I 989) (caring for the
poor is a duty of the medical profession and all physicians should give at least fifty hours of
uncompensated work to the poor each year); George D. Lundberg, National Health Care Reform:
The Aura of Inevitability Intensifies, 267 JAMA 2521, 2524 (1992) ("[T]rue professionalism
means self governance, self-determination, and ethical behavior in the public interest."); ELIOT
FREIDSON, DoCTORING ToGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL (1976).

